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24 April 2006
Deadly Month for U.S. Soldiers in Iraq
AP via NYT, 24 April 2006
Insurgents killed three American soldiers in the Baghdad area Sunday and
fired mortars near the Defense Ministry in a spree of violence that
killed at least 29 Iraqis as politicians began work on forming a new
government.
The largest Sunni Arab party raised new allegations of sectarian
killings -- one of the most urgent issues facing the new leadership.
U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said the next government must
decommission sectarian militias and integrate them into the national
armed forces, warning that the armed groups represent the
''infrastructure for civil war.''
Sunday's deaths raised to eight the number of U.S. troops killed in the
past two days.
At least 61 American service members have died in April, putting it on
track to pass January -- with 62 -- as the deadliest month this year. It
represents a jump over March, which with 31 deaths was the lowest
monthly toll for the Americans since February 2004.
A Spy Speaks Out: Administration Hyped
Selected Intel to Support Policy
CBS 60 Minutes, 23 April 2006
When no weapons of mass destruction surfaced in Iraq, President Bush
insisted that all those WMD claims before the war were the result of
faulty intelligence. But a former top CIA official, Tyler Drumheller a
26-year veteran of the agency has decided to do something CIA
officials at his level almost never do: Speak out.
He tells correspondent Ed Bradley the real failure was not in the
intelligence community but in the White House. He says he saw how the
Bush administration, time and again, welcomed intelligence that fit the
president's determination to go to war and turned a blind eye to
intelligence that did not.
"It just sticks in my craw every time I hear them say its an
intelligence failure. Its an intelligence failure. This was a policy
failure," Drumheller tells Bradley.
Drumheller was the CIA's top man in Europe, the head of covert
operations there, until he retired a year ago. He says he saw firsthand
how the White House promoted intelligence it liked and ignored
intelligence it didnt:
"The idea of going after Iraq was U.S. policy. It was going to happen
one way or the other," says Drumheller.
Drumheller says he doesn't think it mattered very much to the
administration what the intelligence community had to say. "I think it
mattered it if verified. This basic belief that had taken hold in the
U.S. government that now is the time, we had the means, all we needed
was the will," he says.
The road to war in Iraq took some strange turns none stranger than a
detour to the West African country of Niger. In late 2001, a month after
9/11, the United States got a report from the Italian intelligence
service that Saddam Hussein had bought 500 tons of so-called yellowcake
uranium in order to build a nuclear bomb.
..."The American people want to believe the president. I have relatives
who I've tried to talk to about this who say, 'Well, no, you cant tell
me the president had this information and just ignored it,'" says
Drumheller. "But I think over time, people will look back on this and
see this is going to be one of the great, I think, policy mistakes of
all time."
Robert's Intel Committee and
Robb-Silberman Commission Reports 'Fundamentally Dishonest'
Josh Marshall
Talking Points Memo, 24 April 2006
...But here's an angle I'm not sure we're going to hear much about.
Drumheller's account is pretty probative evidence on the question of
whether the White House politicized and cherry-picked the Iraq
intelligence.
So why didn't we hear about any of this in the reports of those Iraq
intel commissions that have given the White House a clean bill of health
on distorting the intel and misleading the country about what we knew
about Iraq's alleged WMD programs?
Think about it. It's devastating evidence against their credibility on a
slew of levels.
Did you read in any of those reports -- even in a way that would protect
sources and methods -- that the CIA had turned a key member of the Iraqi
regime, that that guy had said there weren't any active weapons
programs, and that the White House lost interest in what he was saying
as soon as they realized it didn't help the case for war? What about
what he said about the Niger story?
Did the Robb-Silbermann Commission not hear about what Drumheller had to
say? What about the Roberts Committee?
I asked Drumheller just those questions when I spoke to him early this
evening. He was quite clear. He was interviewed by the Robb-Silbermann
Commission. Three times apparently.
Did he tell them everything he revealed on tonight's 60 Minutes segment.
Absolutely.
Drumheller was also interviewed twice by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (the Roberts Committee) but apparently only after they
released their summer 2004 report.
Now, quite a few of us have been arguing for almost two years now that
those reports were fundamentally dishonest in the story they told about
why we were so badly misled in the lead up to war. The fact that none of
Drumheller's story managed to find its way into those reports, I think,
speaks volumes about the agenda that the writers of those reports were
pursuing.
"I was stunned," Drumheller told me, when so little of the stuff he had
told the commission's and the committee's investigators ended up in
their reports. His colleagues, he said, were equally "in shock" that so
little of what they related ended up in the reports either.
What Drumheller has to say adds quite a lot to our knowledge of what
happened in the lead up to war. But what it shows even more clearly is
that none of this stuff has yet been investigated by anyone whose
principal goal is not covering for the White House.
Secrecy Tightened Within C.I.A.
By SCOTT SHANE and MARK MAZZETTI
NYT, 24 April 2006
The crackdown on leaks at the Central Intelligence Agency that led to
the dismissal of a veteran intelligence officer last week included a
highly unusual polygraph examination for the agency's independent
watchdog, Inspector General John L. Helgerson, intelligence officials
with knowledge of the investigation said Sunday.
The special polygraphs, which have been given to dozens of employees
since January, are part of a broader effort by Porter J. Goss, the
director of the C.I.A., to re-emphasize a culture of secrecy that has
included a marked tightening of the review process for books and
articles by former agency employees.
As the inspector general, Mr. Helgerson was the supervisor of Mary O.
McCarthy, who was fired Thursday after admitting she had leaked
classified information to reporters about secret C.I.A. detention
centers and other subjects, agency officials said.
Mr. Goss and the C.I.A.'s deputy director, Vice Adm. Albert M. Calland
III, voluntarily submitted to polygraph tests during the leak
investigation to show they were willing to experience the same scrutiny
they were asking other employees to undergo, agency officials said. Mr.
Helgerson likewise submitted to the lie-detector test, they said.
But Mr. Helgerson's status as the independent inspector general a post
to which he was appointed by the president and from which only the
president can remove him makes his submission to a polygraph even more
unusual.
L. Britt Snider, who served as inspector general from 1998 to 2001, said
in an interview on Sunday night that he had not been given a polygraph
in that position, though he said he was given an initial polygraph when
he arrived at the agency in 1997 as special counsel to the director.
"I've never heard of it, and it's certainly unusual," Mr. Snider said.
He called it "awkward" for the inspector general to be, in effect,
investigated by the agency he ordinarily investigates.
...Mr. Helgerson's office, which investigates accusations of lapses in
the ethics or performance of agency employees, has investigated some of
the most serious controversies of recent years, including cases
involving accusations of detainee abuse.
Since a 1989 change following the Iran-contra scandal, the C.I.A.'s
internal watchdog has been confirmed by the Senate and has reported to
the Congressional intelligence committees as well as to the C.I.A.
director, a shift intended to assure the position's independence.
Among the subjects handled by Mr. Helgerson's office was a report
completed last year that faulted senior C.I.A. officials for lapses in
the failure to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. But Mr.
Goss kept the report classified and did not punish any of those named.
Former officials say the inspector general's office has also referred
more than half a dozen cases of detainee abuse to the Department of
Justice, but officials there have taken no action, except for a pending
prosecution of one agency contract employee charged with beating an
Afghan prisoner who later died.
The "single-issue" polygraphs, which are distinct from the routine
polygraphs given to agency employees at least every five years, have
been conducted by the C.I.A. Security Center but with close supervision
from Mr. Goss's office, one official said. Like other current and former
intelligence officials, he was granted anonymity to discuss classified
events at the agency without fear of retribution.
...The renewed emphasis on the culture of secrecy has included a
tightening of the review process for books and articles by former agency
employees, said Mark S. Zaid, a lawyer who represents many authors who
once worked for the C.I.A.
Authors say the agency's Publications Review Board has been removing
material that would easily have been approved before. While the board in
the past has generally worked with retirees to make manuscripts
publishable, it now more often appears to be trying to block
publication, the authors say. And reprimands for violations have become
more stern, including letters warning of possible Justice Department
investigations.
A C.I.A. spokeswoman, Jennifer Millerwise Dyck, denied that the
Publications Review Board's standards had changed.
"The only rule is that they are not allowed to have classified
information in their manuscripts," Ms. Millerwise Dyck said.
But Mr. Zaid said: "There's been a fundamental shift in practice at
the Publications Review Board. There's literally been a reinstitution of
the 1950's attitude that what happens at C.I.A. stays at C.I.A."
...Yet another agency retiree, who has in the past received warning
letters from the C.I.A. after occasionally publishing articles without
seeking approval, said he had recently gotten a far more strongly worded
letter. This one informed him that a file had been opened to document
his transgressions that could be forwarded to the Justice Department, he
said.
Mr. Goss's effort to lower the profile of the agency has apparently been
extended to the Web site of its Center for the Study of Intelligence,
which for years has carried unclassified articles about the history and
practice of spying from the in-house journal Studies in Intelligence.
Max Holland, who has written two articles for the C.I.A. journal,
recently reported in The American Spectator that the online posting of
unclassified excerpts from an agency review of the failure to assess
Iraq's unconventional weapons accurately had been delayed for seven
months. The last issue represented on the C.I.A. Web site is from
mid-2005.
Colleagues Say C.I.A. Analyst Played
by the Rules
By DAVID S. CLOUD
NYT, 23 April 2006
In 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered military strikes against a
suspected chemical weapons factory in Sudan, Mary O. McCarthy, a senior
intelligence officer assigned to the White House, warned the president
that the plan relied on inconclusive intelligence, two former government
officials say.
Ms. McCarthy's reservations did not stop the attack on the factory,
which was carried out in retaliation for Al Qaeda's bombing of two
American embassies in East Africa. But they illustrated her willingness
to challenge intelligence data and methods endorsed by her bosses at the
Central Intelligence Agency.
On Thursday, the C.I.A. fired Ms. McCarthy, 61, accusing her of leaking
information to reporters about overseas prisons operated by the agency
in the years since the Sept. 11 attacks. But despite Ms. McCarthy's
independent streak, some colleagues who worked with her at the White
House and other offices during her intelligence career say they cannot
imagine her as a leaker of classified information.
As a senior National Security Council aide for intelligence from 1996 to
2001, she was responsible for guarding some of the nation's most
important secrets.
"We're talking about a person with great integrity who played by the
book and, as far as I know, never deviated from the rules," said Steven
Simon, a security council aide in the Clinton administration who worked
closely with Ms. McCarthy.
Others said it was possible that Ms. McCarthy who made a contribution
to Senator John Kerry's presidential campaign in 2004 had grown
increasingly disenchanted with the methods adopted by the Bush
administration for handling Qaeda prisoners.
Ms. McCarthy, who began attending law school at night several years ago
and was preparing to retire from the C.I.A., may have felt she had no
alternative but to go to the press.
If in fact Ms. McCarthy was the leaker, Richard J. Kerr, a former C.I.A.
deputy director, said, "I have no idea what her motive was, but there is
a lot of dissension within the agency, and it seems to be a rather
unhappy place." Mr. Kerr called Ms. McCarthy "quite a good, substantive
person on the issues I dealt with her on."
Larry Johnson, a former C.I.A. officer who worked for Ms. McCarthy in
the agency's Latin America section, said, "It looks to me like Mary is
being used as a sacrificial lamb."
Kerry...35
Years Later
By BOB HERBERT
NYT, 24 April 2006
Presidents and politicians may worry about losing face, or losing
votes, or losing their legacy; it is time to think about young Americans
and innocent civilians who are losing their lives.
John Kerry on Iraq
Boston
Saturday was the 35th anniversary of John Kerry's appearance as a young
Vietnam veteran before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During
his testimony, Mr. Kerry called for an end to the war in Vietnam and
famously inquired: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a
mistake?"
He marked the occasion Saturday with an important and moving speech
before an audience crammed into historic Faneuil Hall. The speech took
on even more poignancy as it became known over the weekend that at least
eight more American G.I.'s had been killed in Iraq.
I've felt all along that Democratic politicians, including Senator
Kerry, have hurt themselves with their muddled messages on Iraq. Most
elected Democrats have been petrified almost to the point of paralysis
by their fear of being seen as soft on national security. So they've
acquiesced to one degree or another in a war that in their heads and in
their hearts they knew was wrong.
In his speech on Saturday, Senator Kerry, who voted to authorize the use
of force in Iraq, gave the impression of a man who had found a voice
he'd been seeking through trial and error for a long time, perhaps since
that springtime day in Richard Nixon's Washington in 1971.
"I believed then," he said, "just as I believe now, that the best way to
support the troops is to oppose a course that squanders their lives,
dishonors their sacrifice and disserves our people and our principles."
He repeated his call for a complete withdrawal of American combat troops
from Iraq by the end of this year, and offered an uncompromising defense
of the right of all Americans including retired generals to engage
in "untrammeled debate and open dissent" on the war.
"I come here today," he said, "to affirm that it is both a right and an
obligation for Americans to disagree with a president who is wrong, a
policy that is wrong and a war in Iraq that weakens the nation."
He described the war as "rooted in deceit and justified by continuing
deception." And in a comparison with Vietnam, he said it is time now to
get past "the blindness and cynicism" of political leaders who would
continue to send "brave young Americans to be killed or maimed" in a war
that the country had come to realize was a mistake.
By the time he testified in 1971, he said, "it was clear to me that
hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen
disproportionately poor and minority Americans were being sent into
the valley of the shadow of death for an illusion privately abandoned by
the very men who kept sending them there."
All Right, Not All Right: Profiles in
Utter Hypocracy
Juan Cole
Informed Comment
It IS all right for Bush campaign strategist Karl Rove to leak
classified intelligence about the identity of Valerie Plame as an
undercover CIA operative.
It is NOT all right for CIA employee Mary McCarthy to leak classified
information and blow the whistle on secret torture prisons maintained by
the US government in Eastern Europe. (There is disagreement on who the
criminals are here, however.)
It is NOT all right for Larry Franklin, former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz's "go-to" man for Iran at the Pentagon's Near
East and South Asia Iran desk to pass classified documents to the
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which then passed
them on to a spy, Naor Gilon, in the Israeli embassy.
It IS all right for Secretary of State Condi Rice to discuss with AIPAC
Middle East operative Steve Rosen some of the same things that were in
the documents passed to him and Keith Weissman by Larry Franklin, who is
in jail for it.
It MAY be all right for AIPAC lobbyists Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman
to pass classified US Defense documents to Naor Gilon, a spy in the
Israeli embassy in Washington, DC.
It IS all right for AIPAC to seek to continue to secretly employ Rosen
under the cover of the Zionist Organization of America , while publicly
declaring that it had cut all ties with the indicted spy.
It is NOT all right to be a registered lobbyist for the foreign interest
of the Sudan, accused of killing and displacing populations in its
rebellious Darfur province.
It IS all right for AIPAC not to register as the agent of a foreign
power, while lobbying on behalf of a government that has displaced
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, which continues to steal their
land, and which killed 20,000 persons during its 1982 illegal invasion
of Lebanon.
Congressional Investigators Are
Critical of F.D.A.'s Efforts to Detect Drug Dangers
By GARDINER HARRIS
NYT, 24 April 2006
Disorganization, bureaucratic infighting and an inability to force drug
makers to conduct needed safety tests have undercut efforts at the Food
and Drug Administration to uncover drug dangers, government auditors
say.
When drug safety specialists raise alarms about certain medicines, they
sometimes feel that their recommendations fall "into a 'black hole' or
'abyss' " at the agency, according to a report to be released Monday by
the Government Accountability Office, the auditing arm of Congress.
Top agency officials sometimes excluded drug safety specialists from
presenting findings at public hearings, and tensions between officials
who approve drugs and those who ensure that they are safe are common,
the report said.
"F.D.A. lacks clear and effective processes for making decisions about,
and providing management oversight of" issues involving the safety of
popular medicines, the report states.
A New Rightwing Religious Push Against
Gay Unions
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
NYT, 24 April 2006
About 50 prominent religious leaders, including seven Roman Catholic
cardinals and about a half-dozen archbishops, have signed a petition in
support of a constitutional amendment blocking same-sex marriage.
Organizers of the petition said it was in part an effort to revive the
groundswell of opposition to same-sex marriage that helped bring many
conservative voters to the polls in some pivotal states in 2004. The
signers include many influential evangelical Protestants, a few rabbis
and an official of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
But both the organizers and gay rights groups said what was striking
about the petition was the direct involvement by high-ranking Roman
Catholic officials, including 16 bishops. Although the church has long
opposed same-sex unions, and the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops had previously endorsed the idea of a constitutional amendment
banning such unions, it was evangelical Protestants who generally led
the charge when the amendment was debated in 2004.
"The personal involvement of bishops and cardinals is significantly
greater this time than in 2004," said Patrick Korten, a spokesman for
the Knights of Columbus, a lay Catholic group.
The Catholic bishops and many of the other religious leaders involved
have pledged to distribute postcards for their congregants to send to
their senators urging support for the amendment. The Knights of Columbus
is distributing 10 million postcards to Catholic churches.
The petition drive was organized in part by Prof. Robert P. George of
Princeton, a Catholic scholar with close ties to evangelical Protestant
groups. Aides to three Republican senators Bill Frist of Tennessee,
the Republican leader; Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania; and Sam Brownback
of Kansas were also involved, organizers said.
Trade Deficit Understated: It's Worse
than You Think
By PAUL KRUGMAN
NYT, 24 April 2006
...U.S. companies operating abroad don't, in fact, seem to earn
especially high rates of return. Why, then, doesn't the United States
seem to be paying a price for all its borrowing? Because according to
the official data, foreign companies operating in the United States are
remarkably unprofitable, earning an average return of only 2.2 percent a
year.
There's something wrong with this picture. As Daniel Gros of the Center
for European Policy Studies puts it, it's hard to believe that
foreigners would continue investing in the United States "if they were
really being constantly taken to the cleaners."
In a new paper, Mr. Gros argues compellingly, in my view that what's
really happening is that foreign companies are understating the profits
of their U.S. subsidiaries, probably to avoid taxes, and that official
data are, in particular, failing to pick up foreign profits that are
reinvested in U.S. operations.
If Mr. Gros is right, the true position of the U.S. economy isn't as bad
as you think it's worse. The true trade deficit, including unreported
profits that accrue to foreign companies, isn't $800 billion it's more
than $900 billion. And America's foreign debt, including the value of
foreign-owned businesses, is at least $1 trillion bigger than the
official numbers say.
Of course, optimists have a comeback: if things are really that bad, why
are so many foreign investors still buying U.S. bonds? And they point
out that those predicting problems from the trade deficit have been
wrong so far. But I have two words for those who place their faith in
the judgment of investors, and believe that a few good years are enough
to prove the skeptics wrong: Nasdaq 5,000.
Right now, forensic analysis seems to say that the U.S. trade position
is worse, not better, than it looks. And the answer to the question,
"Why haven't we paid a price for our trade deficit?" is, just you wait.
22-23 April 2006
U.N. Exec Decries Illegal Iraq
Detainees
By ALEXANDER G. HIGGINS
AP via The Guardian, 21 April 2006
Some 15,000 detainees are being held in Iraq by government ministries in
violation of Iraqi law, and nearly as many are being held by U.S.-led
multinational forces, a senior U.N. official said Friday.
Only the country's justice ministry is permitted to hold detainees for
longer than 72 hours, but Gianni Magazzeni, head of the U.N. Human
Rights Office in Baghdad, said most Iraqi-held detainees are under the
control of other government officials, naming Iraq's interior and
defense ministries in particular.
``Those are still in the thousands and would be not in a situation which
is in line with Iraqi law,'' he said at the U.N.'s European headquarters
in Geneva. Magazzeni, who took over the post in mid-February, was
visiting Geneva and said he was on his way back to Baghdad. It was
unclear where Magazzeni obtained his figures for detainees held by the
Iraqi government.
He said the 14,222 detainees being held by multinational forces in Iraq
at the end of February for ``imperative reasons of security'' also is
``way too high.''
``We're working very closely with them (the U.S.-led multinational
forces) to try to see that number brought down in a very substantive
way.''
The United States said in February it was holding nearly 14,390
detainees at four major prisons including Abu Ghraib. The figure did not
include people picked up and held at local jails for investigation.
Magazzeni said those detainees should be brought before an Iraqi judge
and be found guilty or be released if they are innocent, Magazzeni said.
He also said cases of torture and summary execution ``are happening
every day.''
He said his office also was receiving reports of an increasing number of
attacks by death squads and militias, which have at least the appearance
of being police or official units.
Iraq: A Litany of Errors
David Corn
DavidCorn.com, 21 April 2006
...[Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies] Cordesman a few days
ago put out a report entitled, "American Strategic, Tactical, and Other
Mistakes in Iraq: A Litany of Errors." The paper includes a long list of
Bush administration blunders. There's nothing on it that you didn't
already know. But the compilation is stunning--and depressing. Here are
the bullet points:
* Inaccurate threat estimates that created a false rationale for
war.
* Diplomatic estimates that exaggerated probable international
support and the ability to win an allied and UN consensus.
* Over-reliance on exile groups with limited credibility and
influence in Iraq.
* Broader failures in intelligence and analysis of the internal
political and economic structure of Iraq.
* Inability to accurately assess the nature of Iraqi nationalism, the
true level of culture differences, and the scale of Iraq's problems.
* Overoptimistic plans for internal Iraqi political and military
support.
* The failure to foresee sectarian and ethnic conflict.
* Failure to anticipate the threat of insurgency and outside
extremist infiltration, in spite of significant intelligence warning,
and to deploy elements of US forces capable of dealing with
counterinsurgency, civil-military operations, and nation building as US
forces advanced and in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the
regime.
* Rejection of the importance of stability operations and nation
building before, during, and immediately after the war.
* Shortfalls in US military strength and capability to provide the
personnel and skills necessary to secure Iraqi rear areas and urban
areas as the Coalition advanced, and to prevent the massive looting of
government offices and facilities, military bases, and arms depots as
the during and after the fighting.
* Planning for premature US military withdrawals from Iraq before the
situation was clear or secure.
* Inability to execute a key feature of the war plan by
miscalculating Turkey's willingness to allow the deployment of US forces
and transit through Turkey.
* Failure to anticipate and prepare for Iraqi expectations after the
collapse of Saddam's regime.
* A failure to plan and execute effective and broadly based
information operations before, during and after the invasion to win the
"hearts and minds of Iraqis."
* Failure to react to the wartime collapse of Iraqi military,
security, and police forces and focus immediately on creating effective
Iraqi forces.
* Lack of effective planning for economic aid and reconstruction.
* Initial lack of a major aid program for stability operations.
* Not giving ORHA a meaningful mandate for conflict termination,
stability operations, and nationbuilding effort.
He adds:
It is true that foresight is more difficult than "20-20
hindsight." Many, if not most, of the factors that led to these failures
were, however, brought to the attention of the President, National
Security Council, State Department, Department of Defense, and
intelligence community in the summer and fall of 2002. No one accurately
prophesized all of the future, but many inside and outside government
warned what it might be.
The problem was not that the interagency system did not work in
providing many key elements of an accurate assessment. The problem was
the most senior political and military decision makers ignored what they
felt was negative advice.
Forget about Rumsfeld. As the above--long but still partial--list
shows, the whole lot of the Bush warriors (Cheney, Rice, Tenet,
Wolfowitz, Feith, Powell, Libby, Bremer) screwed up royally. And the
fellow at the top--George W. Bush--deserves the ultimate blame. It's
some list. If you can stand to have your blood pressure raised, read the
full report
here.
Old States, New Threats
You know these bad guys. But there is a whole other world of tyrants,
dictators and despots.
By Robert D. Kaplan
Washington Post, 23 April 2006
...Borders may be eroding and stateless terrorist groups like al-Qaeda
proliferating, but don't be fooled: The traditional state remains the
most dangerous force on the international scene. Perhaps the greatest
security threat we face today is from a paranoid and resentful state
leader, armed with biological or nuclear weapons and willing to make
strategic use of stateless terrorists.
These old-fashioned bad guys often have uncertain popular support, but
that does not make them easy to dislodge. We don't live in a democratic
world so much as in a world in the throes of a very messy democratic
transition, so national elections combined with weak, easily politicized
institutions produce a lethal mix -- dictators armed with
pseudo-democratic legitimacy. And they come in many shapes and forms.
Iraq's PM - Designate Maliki Faces
Major Test
Reuters via NYT, 23 April 2006
Jawad al-Maliki's appointment as prime minister-designate was applauded
by Iraqi leaders and President Bush, but he now has the daunting task of
forming a coalition able to avert any slide into civil war.
The Shi'ite politician's image as a tough talker seems to fit well in a
country where many say only a strong man can lead them.
But many Iraqis living beyond the fortified government complex in
Baghdad were already saying before his appointment on Saturday they
doubted any of Iraq's present leaders could deliver quick relief from
guerrilla and sectarian violence.
Underlining the dangers, at least five people died in a mortar attack
near the Defense Ministry in Baghdad on Sunday. Three rockets were also
fired near a soccer stadium, but no one was hurt.
Amid the bloodshed, the disillusionment of ordinary Iraqis has deepened
during four months of political paralysis that had held up the formation
of a new government. It was also exacerbated by promises in December
elections of fast action to tackle Iraq's woes.
``We are going to form a family that will not be based on sectarian or
ethnic backgrounds,'' Maliki told reporters, seeking to shed a hardline
Shi'ite image and present himself as a prime minister able to unite
Shi'ite Muslims, Sunni Arabs and Kurds.
But in his first policy speech, Maliki called for Iraq's powerful
militias to be merged with U.S.-trained security forces -- an explosive
issue in the country because militias are tied to political parties and
operate along religious lines.
``Arms should be in the hands of the government. There is a law that
calls for the merging of militias with the armed forces,'' said Maliki,
nominated by the ruling Shi'ite Alliance, the largest bloc in
parliament.
The United States has called in the past for militias to be disarmed,
and U.S ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has said militiamen are killing more
people than insurgents.
Washington hopes a national unity government will foster stability and
enable it to start bringing home its more than 130,000 troops.
Young Officers Join the Debate
Over Rumsfeld
By THOM SHANKER and ERIC SCHMITT
NYT, 23 April 2006
The revolt by retired generals who publicly criticized Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld has opened an extraordinary debate among younger
officers, in military academies, in the armed services' staff colleges
and even in command posts and mess halls in Iraq.
Junior and midlevel officers are discussing whether the war plans for
Iraq reflected unvarnished military advice, whether the retired generals
should have spoken out, whether active-duty generals will feel free to
state their views in private sessions with the civilian leaders and,
most divisive of all, whether Mr. Rumsfeld should resign.
In recent weeks, military correspondents of The Times discussed those
issues with dozens of younger officers and cadets in classrooms and with
combat units in the field, as well as in informal conversations at the
Pentagon and in e-mail exchanges and telephone calls.
To protect their careers, the officers were granted anonymity so they
could speak frankly about the debates they have had and have heard. The
stances that emerged are anything but uniform, although all seem colored
by deep concern over the quality of civil-military relations, and the
way ahead in Iraq.
The discussions often flare with anger, particularly among many midlevel
officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and face the prospect
of additional tours of duty.
"This is about the moral bankruptcy of general officers who lived
through the Vietnam era yet refused to advise our civilian leadership
properly," said one Army major in the Special Forces who has served two
combat tours. "I can only hope that my generation does better someday."
An Army major who is an intelligence specialist said: "The history I
will take away from this is that the current crop of generals failed to
stand up and say, 'We cannot do this mission.' They confused the
cultural can-do attitude with their responsibilities as leaders to delay
the start of the war until we had an adequate force. I think the
backlash against the general officers will be seen in the resignation of
officers" who might otherwise have stayed in uniform.
With Ethics in Question, GOP Seeks
Answers
By Shailagh Murray and Chris Cillizza
Washinton Post, 23 April 2006
The ethical furnace keeps getting hotter for House Republicans. Even
Rep. Tom Reynolds, who heads the GOP reelection effort, is feeling some
heat.
The four-term New Yorker is being targeted by a liberal watchdog group,
New Yorkers for a Cleaner Congress, for taking "more lobbyist-funded
luxury trips outside of western New York in the last three years than he
has returned home to western New York." The group singles out jaunts to
Pebble Beach, Calif., by Reynolds that have totaled $205,185 over five
years.
Reynolds's office dismissed the criticism as politically motivated.
"Just like the national Democratic Party, Jack Davis and his friends
can't put forth any positive ideas, so instead they have to run negative
ads and spread misinformation," said L.D. Platt, spokesman for Reynolds,
referring to his boss's Democratic opponent.
Republicans are increasingly nervous about their ability to hold the
House in November, and not only because of the sour national mood over
the war in Iraq and rising gas prices. Increasingly, local media and
political opponents are putting the ethics of GOP House candidates under
a microscope.
A Youngstown newspaper found that Charles Blasdel, the GOP front-runner
in an open-seat race in Ohio and a financial adviser by profession, has
about $50,000 in delinquent business taxes. Rick O'Donnell, who is
seeking an open seat in Colorado, has drawn fire from Denver newspapers
for including Environmental Protection Agency administrator Stephen L.
Johnson's title on a fundraising invitation -- a violation of the Hatch
Act. The event drew oil and gas officials with business before the EPA.
Ten-term Pennsylvania Rep. Curt Weldon's close ties to lobbyists are
getting a close look, while Rep. John Sweeney of New York has drawn flak
for taking a ski trip to Utah with lobbyists.
Carl Forti, spokesman for the National Republican Campaign Committee,
which Reynolds leads, said the Duke Cunningham corruption case appears
to have stirred a hornet's nest. "Anytime a member of Congress is going
to jail, it's news," Forti said.
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